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Religious fragmentation, social identity and rent-seeking: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India

Author

Listed:
  • Surajeet Chakravarty

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

  • Miguel A. Fonseca

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

  • Sudeep Ghosh

    (Hong Kong Polytechnic University)

  • Sugata Marjit

    (DCenter for Studies in the Social Sciences, Calcutta)

Abstract

We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on rent seeking behavior. We report on a series of two-player Tullock contest experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural West Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. We find no statistically significant differences in rent seeking behavior across different villages. We also do not find any significant differences in behavior as a function of players' identities. This is in contrast to evidence from the same sample which recorded significant differences in cooperation levels in prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games. We attribute this to the fact that social identity may have a more powerful effect on cooperation than on confl ict.

Suggested Citation

  • Surajeet Chakravarty & Miguel A. Fonseca & Sudeep Ghosh & Sugata Marjit, 2015. "Religious fragmentation, social identity and rent-seeking: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India," Discussion Papers 1512, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:1512
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    File URL: https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP1512.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Ghosh, Sudeep & Marjit, Sugata, 2016. "Religious fragmentation, social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 265-279.
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    4. Morita, Hodaka & Servátka, Maroš, 2013. "Group identity and relation-specific investment: An experimental investigation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 95-109.
    5. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2011. "Rent seeking in groups," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 116-125, January.
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    7. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
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    1. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Ghosh, Sudeep & Marjit, Sugata, 2016. "Religious fragmentation, social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 265-279.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Identity; Social Fragmentation; Artefactual Field Experiment; Rent Seeking.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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