IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eve/wpaper/23-01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

What if compulsory insurance triggered self-insurance? An experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Corcos

    (CURAPP-ESS UMR 7319, CNRS and Université de Picardie Jules Verne)

  • François Pannequin

    (CEPS, ENS Paris-Saclay and University of Paris-Saclay)

  • Claude Montmarquette

    (Cirano and Université de Montréal)

Abstract

Although it avoids the negative externalities associated with the damages caused by uninsured individuals, compulsory insurance raises the issue of insurance crowding out prevention. Interestingly, Pannequin and Corcos ((2020)) show that on a theoretical level, although compulsory insurance and self-insurance (prevention investments dedicated to loss reduction) are substitutes for risk averters, they are complementary for risk lovers. The present contribution aims to test, in the Lab, these surprising results using a model-based experimental design. Our experimental results support the theoretical predictions: compulsory insurance and self-insurance are complementary for risk lovers and substitutes for risk averters. This contribution fully supports public policies that aim to implement mandatory insurance. Far from deterring prevention activities and providing that its level is high enough, mandatory insurance increases prevention levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Corcos & François Pannequin & Claude Montmarquette, 2023. "What if compulsory insurance triggered self-insurance? An experimental evidence," Documents de recherche 23-01, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:eve:wpaper:23-01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.univ-evry.fr/fileadmin/mediatheque/ueve-institutionnel/03_Recherche/laboratoires/Epee/pub/WorkingPapers_CEPS_1.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. W. J. Wouter Botzen & Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2019. "Protecting against disaster risks: Why insurance and prevention may be complements," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 151-169, October.
    2. Mol, Jantsje M. & Botzen, W. J. Wouter & Blasch, Julia E., 2020. "Risk reduction in compulsory disaster insurance: Experimental evidence on moral hazard and financial incentives," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter John Robinson & W. J. Wouter Botzen & Fujin Zhou, 2021. "An experimental study of charity hazard: The effect of risky and ambiguous government compensation on flood insurance demand," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 275-318, December.
    2. Hangsuck Lee & Minha Lee & Jimin Hong, 2024. "Optimal insurance for repetitive natural disasters under moral hazard," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 247-277, December.
    3. Jantsje M. Mol & W. J. Wouter Botzen & Julia E. Blasch & Hans de Moel, 2020. "Insights into Flood Risk Misperceptions of Homeowners in the Dutch River Delta," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(7), pages 1450-1468, July.
    4. Kakuho Furukawa & Hibiki Ichiue & Noriyuki Shiraki, 2020. "How Does Climate Change Interact with the Financial System? A Survey," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 20-E-8, Bank of Japan.
    5. Staněk, Rostislav & Krčál, Ondřej & Čellárová, Katarína, 2022. "Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    6. Sahar Zavareh Hofmann, 2022. "Build Back Better and Long-Term Housing Recovery: Assessing Community Housing Resilience and the Role of Insurance Post Disaster," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-23, May.
    7. repec:cup:judgdm:v:17:y:2022:i:1:p:189-214 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ruikun Peng & Yinyin Zhao & Ehsan Elahi & Benhong Peng, 2021. "Does disaster shocks affect farmers’ willingness for insurance? Mediating effect of risk perception and survey data from risk-prone areas in East China," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 106(3), pages 2883-2899, April.
    9. Thomas Husted & David Nickerson, 2021. "Private Support for Public Disaster Aid," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-19, June.
    10. Pedro Brandão Graminha & Luís Eduardo Afonso, 2022. "Behavioral Economics and Auto Insurance: The Role of Biases and Heuristics," RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Journal of Contemporary Administration), ANPAD - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração, vol. 26(5), pages 200421-2004.
    11. Asadul Islam & C. Matthew Leister & Minhaj Mahmud & Paul A. Raschky, 2020. "Natural disaster and risk-sharing behavior: Evidence from rural Bangladesh," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 67-99, August.
    12. Bradt, Jacob T. & Kousky, Carolyn & Wing, Oliver E.J., 2021. "Voluntary purchases and adverse selection in the market for flood insurance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    13. Christian Knoller & Stefan Neuß & Richard Peter, 2021. "How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, January.
    14. Schrieks, Teun & Botzen, W.J. Wouter & Haer, Toon & Aerts, Jeroen C.J.H., 2024. "Drought risk attitudes in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in Kenya," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    15. Chiradip Chatterjee & Nafisa Halim & Pallab Mozumder, 2021. "Emission Tax, Health Insurance, and Information: A Mechanism Design for Reducing Energy Consumption and Emission Risk," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 465-480, October.
    16. Augier, Laurent & Yin, Chao, 2022. "Financial market economy vs self-financing economy and the role of risk aversion," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 15-28.
    17. Jantsje M. Mol & W. J. Wouter Botzen & Julia E. Blasch, 2022. "After the virtual flood: Risk perceptions and flood preparedness after virtual reality risk communication," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 17(1), pages 189-214, January.
    18. Stefan Borsky & Hannah Hennighausen, 2022. "Public Flood Risk Mitigation and the Homeowner’s Insurance Demand Response," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 98(4), pages 537-559.
    19. Arthur Charpentier & Laurence Barry & Molly R. James, 2022. "Insurance against natural catastrophes: balancing actuarial fairness and social solidarity," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 47(1), pages 50-78, January.
    20. Meri Davlasheridze & Qing Miao, 2021. "Does post-disaster aid promote community resilience? Evidence from federal disaster programs," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 109(1), pages 63-88, October.
    21. Paul Hudson & Annegret H. Thieken, 2022. "The presence of moral hazard regarding flood insurance and German private businesses," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 112(2), pages 1295-1319, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    compulsory insurance; self-insurance; experiment; risk-attitudes; substitutability; complementarity;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eve:wpaper:23-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Samuel Nosel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/epevrfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.