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Outsourcing Active Ownership in Japan

Author

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  • Marco BECHT
  • Julian FRANKS
  • Hideaki MIYAJIMA
  • Kazunori SUZUKI

Abstract

This paper examines active ownership in Japan by an equity ownership service, Governance for Owners Japan (GOJ). GOJ engages with portfolio companies on behalf of Japanese and international institutional investors. The engagements are exclusively private and are not observable to the public. We use the stated objectives of the interventions to measure the incidence of success, and the stock market response to the public announcement of engagement outcomes. We find a high rate of success and average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of about 2.6 percent between -5 and +5 trading days of an event date in response to outcome announcements. Since there is more than one outcome per engagement, the average CARs per engagement is 6.5 percent. Target companies were more likely to adopt recommendations proposed in GOJ's private engagements than in a sample of public activist engagements over a similar period.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco BECHT & Julian FRANKS & Hideaki MIYAJIMA & Kazunori SUZUKI, 2021. "Outsourcing Active Ownership in Japan," Discussion papers 21051, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:21051
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    File URL: https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/21e051.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marco Becht & Julian Franks & Jeremy Grant & Hannes F. Wagner, 2017. "Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(9), pages 2933-2971.
    2. JOSEPH A. McCAHERY & ZACHARIAS SAUTNER & LAURA T. STARKS, 2016. "Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(6), pages 2905-2932, December.
    3. John Buchanan & Dominic H. Chai & Simon Deakin, 2018. "Unexpected Corporate Outcomes from Hedge Find Activism in Japan," Working Papers wp494, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:4:p:1335-1362 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Katsuyuki Kubo, 2012. "Presidents’ Compensation in Japan," Chapters, in: Research Handbook on Executive Pay, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Hideaki Miyajima, 2014. "The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(9), pages 2580-2625.
    7. Marco Becht & Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2010. "Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Governance, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Hoshi,Takeo & Lipscy,Phillip Y. (ed.), 2021. "The Political Economy of the Abe Government and Abenomics Reforms," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108843959, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gillan, Stuart L. & Nguyen, Nga & Nishikawa, Takeshi, 2023. "Heterogeneity in shareholder activism: Evidence from Japan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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