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Banking-on-the-Average Rules

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Abstract

In this paper, we argue for a regulatory framework under which a bank’s required level of equity capital depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such bankingon- the-average rules are transparent and could also be combined with the current regulatory framework. In addition, we argue that banking-on-the-average rules ensure the build-up of bank equity capitals in booms and thus avoid excessive leverage. Prudent banks can impose prudency on other banks. In a simple model of a banking system, we show that a banking-on-the-average framework can deliver the socially optimal solution because it induces banks to abstain from gambling. Moreover, it alleviates socially harmful consequences of conventional equity-capital rules, which may induce banks to excessively cut back on lending or liquidate desirable long-term investment projects in downturns.

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  • Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Banking-on-the-Average Rules," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/107, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-107
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    1. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Banking-on-the-Average Rules," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/107, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Heid, Frank, 2007. "The cyclical effects of the Basel II capital requirements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3885-3900, December.
    3. Rafael Repullo & Jesús Saurina & Carlos Trucharte, 2010. "Mitigating the pro-cyclicality of Basel II [Bank loan loss provisions: a re-examination of capital management, earnings management and signalling effects]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 25(64), pages 659-702.
    4. Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 129-207, June.
    5. Gersbach, Hans, 2004. "Financial Intermediation with Contingent Contracts and Macroeconomic Risks," CEPR Discussion Papers 4735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Van den Heuvel, Skander J., 2008. "The welfare cost of bank capital requirements," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 298-320, March.
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    8. Scott, Hal S. (ed.), 2005. "Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195169713.
    9. Gordy, Michael B. & Howells, Bradley, 2006. "Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the disease without killing the patient?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 395-417, July.
    10. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    11. Scholes, Myron S, 1972. "The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 179-211, April.
    12. R. Alton Gilbert & Courtenay C. Stone & Michael E. Trebing, 1985. "The new bank capital adequacy standards," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 67(May), pages 12-20.
    13. Tolga Ediz & Ian Michael & William Perraudin, 1998. "The impact of capital requirements on U.K. bank behaviour," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 4(Oct), pages 15-22.
    14. Gersbach, Hans, 2009. "Private Insurance Against Systemic Crises?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2010. "Trade and welfare: Does industrial organization matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 85-87, November.
    2. Claudia M. Buch & Sandra Eickmeier & Esteban Prieto, 2014. "Macroeconomic Factors and Microlevel Bank Behavior," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(4), pages 715-751, June.
    3. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Wierts, Peter, 2015. "Regulating the financial cycle: An integrated approach with a leverage ratio," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 70-72.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Banking-on-the-Average Rules," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/107, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    5. Athanasoglou, Panayiotis P. & Daniilidis, Ioannis & Delis, Manthos D., 2014. "Bank procyclicality and output: Issues and policies," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 58-83.
    6. Panayiotis P. Athanasoglou & Ioannis Daniilidis, 2011. "Procyclicality in the banking industry: causes, consequences and response," Working Papers 139, Bank of Greece.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking on the average; equity-capital requirements; banking system; banking crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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