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Policy design and the optimal location of forests in Flanders

Author

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  • Ellen Moons

    (K.U.Leuven-Center for Economic Studies)

  • Sandra Rousseau

    (K.U.Leuven-Center for Economic Studies)

Abstract

This paper analyses the current Flemish afforestation policy and shows that this policy is likely to be non-optimal and can be improved. An important step in improving the afforestation policy in Flanders is the selection of the optimal location of a cluster of new forests as a whole. The analysis of the optimal location can provide the regulator with objective criteria, which can be used to develop optimal regulations. It is also worthwhile to consider alternative policies, such as auctions for afforestations projects. To this effect, we investigate several policy options and test these in a real-life example for the creation of new forests in East Flanders.

Suggested Citation

  • Ellen Moons & Sandra Rousseau, 2005. "Policy design and the optimal location of forests in Flanders," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0505, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0505
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
    2. Drake, Lars, 1992. "The Non-market Value of the Swedish Agricultural Landscape," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 19(3), pages 351-364.
    3. Bart Muys Stef Proost & Gaby Deckmyn & Ellen Moons & Juan Garcia Quijano & Stef Proost & Reinhart Ceulemans, 2003. "An integrated decision support tool for the prediction and evaluation of efficiency, environmental impact and total social cost of forestry projects in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0306, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    4. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    5. Ellen Moons & B Saveyn & Stef Proost & Martin Hermy, 2005. "Optimal location of new forests in a suburban area," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 544035, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    6. Garrod, G. D. & Willis, K. G., 1997. "The non-use benefits of enhancing forest biodiversity: A contingent ranking study," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 45-61, April.
    7. Signe Anthon & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, 2004. "Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric information on Private Environmental Benefits," Working Papers 2004.46, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    9. Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2005. "Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 32(3), pages 337-365, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rousseau Sandra & Moons Ellen, "undated". "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: An Application to the Flemish Afforestation Policy," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0606, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

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    Keywords

    Afforestation / policy instruments / optimal location;

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