Policy design and the optimal location of forests in Flanders
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- Rousseau Sandra & Moons Ellen, "undated". "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: An Application to the Flemish Afforestation Policy," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0606, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
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Keywords
Afforestation / policy instruments / optimal location;NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENV-2005-10-04 (Environmental Economics)
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