The Core of a Partition Function Game
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- Laszlo Aron Koczy, 2000. "The Core of a Partition Function Game," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 500647, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "The Core of a Partition Function Game," Game Theory and Information 0012004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
new economy; internet; firm performance; e-procurement; e-business Classification-JEL: D0; L0; O3; M0 Creation-Date: 2000-03;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2008-04-12 (Game Theory)
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