Special interest politics and aid fungibility
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- Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos, Pascalis, 2000. "Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 2482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mr. Tito Cordella & Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2003. "Budget Support Versus Project Aid," IMF Working Papers 2003/088, International Monetary Fund.
- Carsten Hefeker, 2006.
"Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions,"
Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 241-252, May.
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2004. "Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions," HWWA Discussion Papers 309, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2005. "Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions," Discussion Paper Series 26381, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2005. "Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 19, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- O0 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - General
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