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Preventing Odious Obligations: A New Tool for Protecting Citizens from Illegitimate Regimes

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  • Centre for Global Development

Abstract

This report sets out a way to prevent an all-too-common form of theft from some of the world’s poorest people. An illegitimate, unelected regime signs a contract with a foreign agent, handing over part of the national patrimony in exchange for a short-run payment, which the regime appropriates or uses in part to finance repression. Legitimate successor regimes often need to levy taxes to fulfill debt contracts incurred in this manner for fear of legal retribution and loss of reputation with investors if they fail to repay. And in the case of natural resource contracts, citizens continue to suffer from the sweetheart contracts that deprive the government of deserved revenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Centre for Global Development, 2010. "Preventing Odious Obligations: A New Tool for Protecting Citizens from Illegitimate Regimes," Working Papers id:3300, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3300
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza, 2020. "The Hausmann–Gorky Effect," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 175-195, September.
    2. Ravetti, Chiara & Sarr, Mare & Swanson, Tim, 2018. "Foreign aid and political instability in resource-rich countries," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 277-294.
    3. Anna Gelpern, 2014. "Debt Sanctions Can Help Ukraine and Fill a Gap in the International Financial System," Policy Briefs PB14-20, Peterson Institute for International Economics.

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