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The US and Ireland Approach to Sentencing in Cartel Cases: the Citroen Case

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  • Gorecki, Paul K.
  • Maxwell, Sarah

Abstract

Developing a coherent evidence based methodology for determining sanctions in cartel cases is vitally important for robust cartel enforcement in Ireland. This methodology should take into account aggravating/mitigating factors for individuals as well as culpability indicators for firms, while at the same time taking cognisance of the economic damage caused by cartels to consumers. Irish Courts, despite presiding over 33 convictions on indictment for cartel offences stretching back over six years have, as yet, to develop such a methodology. While the Duffy judgment, the only reported judgment on sentencing of a cartel member, the Court provides some guidance on sentencing. It states, for example, that cartels are bad and pernicious and that jail sentences are to be expected in future cartel cases. This is not a coherent sentencing methodology. The Sentencing Guidelines, developed by the US Sentencing Commission, provide such a methodology, while at the same allowing for judicial discretion. Applying that methodology to the facts of the Citroen cartel case in Ireland, in which 14 individuals and firms were convicted on indictment, suggests that the current approach to sentencing in Ireland by the Courts results in fines and jail sentences that are too low. This encourages rather than discourages cartel activity which raises prices for consumers and thus damages consumer welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Gorecki, Paul K. & Maxwell, Sarah, 2013. "The US and Ireland Approach to Sentencing in Cartel Cases: the Citroen Case," Papers WP447, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
  • Handle: RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp447
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mariuzzo, Franco & Walsh, Patrick Paul & van Parys, Olivier, 2009. "Estimating the Price Overcharge from Cartelisation of the Irish Automobile Industry," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 40(2), pages 165-182.
    2. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.
    3. Gorecki, Paul K. & Maxwell, Sarah, 2012. "Sentencing in Criminal Cartel Cases in Ireland: the Duffy Judgment," Papers WP443, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
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