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Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus: The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area

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  • Gros, Daniel

Abstract

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

Suggested Citation

  • Gros, Daniel, 2013. "Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus: The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area," CEPS Papers 7904, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:7904
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    File URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB%20No%20289%20DG%20BU%20with%20a%20Sovereign%20Virus.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. De Groen, Willem Pieter, 2015. "The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments," CEPS Papers 10299, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    2. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2018. "Economic governance in the euro area: balancing risk reduction and risk sharing," Chapters, in: Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner (ed.), Debt Default and Democracy, chapter 7, pages 124-154, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Eleonora Cutrini & Giorgio Galeazzi, 2017. "External Public Debt, Trade Linkages and Contagion During the Eurozone Crisis," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(9), pages 1718-1749, September.
    4. Jack Bekooij & Jon Frost & Remco van der Molen & Krzysztof Muzalewski, 2016. "Hazardous tango: Sovereign-bank interdependencies across countries and time," DNB Working Papers 541, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    5. Coimbra, Nuno, 2020. "Sovereigns at risk: A dynamic model of sovereign debt and banking leverage," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    6. Paolo Angelini & Giuseppe Grande & Fabio Panetta, 2014. "The negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 213, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    7. repec:cmj:journl:y:2013:i:27:turliucd,popovicia is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Gianluca Cafiso, 2014. "Debt Sustainability in the Case of External Debt. An Analysis Based on Italy's Treasury Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5021, CESifo.
    9. Gianluca Cafiso, 2013. "Public-Debt Financing in the case of External Debt," Working Papers 2013-37, CEPII research center.
    10. van Riet, Ad, 2016. "Government Funding Privileges in European Financial Law : Making Public Debt Everybody's Favourite?," Other publications TiSEM b1290139-3e4e-4a2d-a783-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Kathrin Berensmann & Florence Dafe & Ulrich Volz, 2015. "Developing local currency bond markets for long-term development financing in Sub-Saharan Africa," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 31(3-4), pages 350-378.
    12. Mario Sarcinelli, 2013. "The European Banking Union: Will It Be a True Union without Risk Sharing?," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 66(265), pages 137-167.
    13. Eleonora Cutrini and Giorgio Galeazzi, 2014. "Contagion in the Euro crisis: capital flows and trade linkages," Working Papers 44-2014, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Nov 2014.
    14. Micossi, Stefano, 2017. "A Blueprint for Completing the Banking Union," CEPS Papers 13212, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    15. Dragos G. TURLIUC & Andreea N. POPOVICI, 2013. "TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION-Literature review," SEA - Practical Application of Science, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 1, pages 221-229, June.
    16. Gros, Daniel, 2015. "Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance," CEPS Papers 11143, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    17. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2016. "Risk Reduction and Risk Sharing in the Governance of the Euro Area," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 463-488.
    18. Fritz Breuss, 2013. "European Banking Union," WIFO Working Papers 454, WIFO.
    19. Michele Lanotte & Giacomo Manzelli & Anna Maria Rinaldi & Marco Taboga & Pietro Tommasino, 2016. "Easier said than done? Reforming the prudential treatment of banks� sovereign exposures," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 326, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    20. De Groen, Willem Pieter, 2016. "The EBA EU-wide Stress Test 2016: Deciphering the black box," CEPS Papers 11768, Centre for European Policy Studies.

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