IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ems/eureri/248.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Dividing the Pie

Author

Listed:
  • Flood, M.D.
  • Koedijk, C.G.
  • van Dijk, M.A.
  • van Leeuwen, I.W.

Abstract

We examine the consequences of transparency in an experimental multiple-dealer market with asymmetrically informed dealers. Five professional securities traders make a market for a single security. In each trading round, one of the dealers (the "insider") is told the security's true value. We vary both pre-trade and post-trade transparency by changing the way quote and trade information is published. The insider's profits are greatest when price efficiency is lowest. Price efficiency, in turn, is reduced by pre-trade transparency and increased by posttrade transparency. Market liquidity, measured by dealers' bid-ask spreads, is improved by pre-trade transparency and reduced by post-trade transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Flood, M.D. & Koedijk, C.G. & van Dijk, M.A. & van Leeuwen, I.W., 2002. "Dividing the Pie," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2002-101-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:248
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repub.eur.nl/pub/248/erimrs20021029120140.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. Mark Isaac & Duncan James, 2000. "Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 995-1004, September.
    2. Plott, Charles R & Sunder, Shyam, 1982. "Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 663-698, August.
    3. Madhavan, Ananth, 1995. "Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the Disclosure of Trading Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 579-603.
    4. Schnitzlein, Charles R, 1996. "Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 613-636, June.
    5. Seppi, Duane J, 1990. "Equilibrium Block Trading and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 73-94, March.
    6. Friedman,Daniel & Sunder,Shyam, 1994. "Experimental Methods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521456821, October.
    7. Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R., 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 71-100, March.
    8. Madhavan, Ananth & Cheng, Minder, 1997. "In Search of Liquidity: Block Trades in the Upstairs and Downstairs Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 175-203.
    9. Madhavan, Ananth, 1992. "Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 607-641, June.
    10. Julian Franks & Stephen Schaefer, 1995. "Equity Market Transparency On The London Stock Exchange," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 8(1), pages 70-78, March.
    11. Flood, Mark D, et al, 1999. "Quote Disclosure and Price Discovery in Multiple-Dealer Financial Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(1), pages 37-59.
    12. Sunder, S., 1992. "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey," GSIA Working Papers 1992-19, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    13. Bloomfield, Robert & O'Hara, Maureen, 1999. "Market Transparency: Who Wins and Who Loses?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(1), pages 5-35.
    14. Richard K. Lyons, 1996. "Foreign Exchange Volume: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?," NBER Chapters, in: The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets, pages 183-208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-887, August.
    16. Pagano, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1996. "Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 579-611, June.
    17. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Giampaolo Galli & Alberto Giovannini, 1996. "The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number fran96-1.
    18. Easley, David & O'Hara, Maureen, 1992. "Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 576-605, June.
    19. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Zhuowei & Dunne, Peter G. & Li, Youwei, 2015. "Price discovery in the dual-platform US Treasury market," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 95-110.
    2. Dunne, Peter & Moore, Michael J. & Portes, Richard, 2006. "An Empirical Analysis of Transparency-Related Characteristics of European and US Sovereign Bond Markets," Research Technical Papers 9/RT/06, Central Bank of Ireland.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Biais, Bruno & Glosten, Larry & Spatt, Chester, 2005. "Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 217-264, May.
    2. Theissen, Erik, 2000. "Market structure, informational efficiency and liquidity: An experimental comparison of auction and dealer markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 333-363, November.
    3. Loon, Yee Cheng & Zhong, Zhaodong (Ken), 2016. "Does Dodd-Frank affect OTC transaction costs and liquidity? Evidence from real-time CDS trade reports," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 645-672.
    4. Madhavan, Ananth, 2000. "Market microstructure: A survey," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 205-258, August.
    5. John Board & Charles Sutcliffe & Stephen Wells, 2002. "Transparency and Fragmentation," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-4039-0707-3, December.
    6. Pham, Thu Phuong & Westerholm, P. Joakim, 2013. "A survey of research into broker identity and limit order book," Working Papers 17212, University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, revised 16 Oct 2013.
    7. Peter Gomber & Satchit Sagade & Erik Theissen & Moritz Christian Weber & Christian Westheide, 2017. "Competition Between Equity Markets: A Review Of The Consolidation Versus Fragmentation Debate," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 792-814, July.
    8. Morone, Andrea & Nuzzo, Simone, 2015. "Market Efficiency, Trading Institutions and Information Mirages: evidence from an experimental asset market," MPRA Paper 67448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Liang Ding & Hao Zou & Vittorio Addona, 2012. "Semi‐transparency, dealership market, and foreign exchange market quality," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(1), pages 1-13, January.
    10. Victoria Saporta, 1997. "Which Inter-dealer Market Prevails? An analysis of inter-dealer trading in opaque markets," Bank of England working papers 59, Bank of England.
    11. Comerton-Forde, Carole & Putniņš, Tālis J., 2015. "Dark trading and price discovery," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 70-92.
    12. Lamoureux, Christopher G. & Schnitzlein, Charles R., 2004. "Microstructure with multiple assets: an experimental investigation into direct and indirect dealer competition," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-143, February.
    13. Bessembinder, Hendrik & Maxwell, William & Venkataraman, Kumar, 2006. "Market transparency, liquidity externalities, and institutional trading costs in corporate bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 251-288, November.
    14. Madhavan, Ananth & Porter, David & Weaver, Daniel, 2005. "Should securities markets be transparent?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 265-287, August.
    15. Sabrina Buti & Barbara Rindi & Ingrid M. Werner, 2011. "Dark Pool Trading Strategies," Working Papers 421, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    16. Comerton-Forde, Carole & Rydge, James, 2006. "The influence of call auction algorithm rules on market efficiency," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 199-222, May.
    17. DESGRANGES, Gabriel & FOUCAULT, Thierry, 2000. "Reputation-based pricing and price improvements in dealership markets," HEC Research Papers Series 716, HEC Paris, revised 01 Mar 2002.
    18. Jan Krahnen & Martin Weber, 2001. "Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 55-85, June.
    19. Comerton-Forde, Carole & Tang, Kar Mei, 2009. "Anonymity, liquidity and fragmentation," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 337-367, August.
    20. Vitale, Paolo, 1999. "Sterilised central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 245-267, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    experimental economics; financial markets; information asymmetry; market microstructure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:248. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: RePub (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/erimanl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.