IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/84205.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Central Bank’s optimal balance sheet size?

Author

Listed:
  • Goodhart, Charles

Abstract

Unlike other facets of monetary policy renormalisation, there has been little discussion yet of what principles should determine the optimum size of a Central Bank's balance sheet, the end-point to which on-going portfolio reductions should approach. In this note I start by addressing the arguments of those who would leave this balance sheet very large, much as now; and then continue with the counter-arguments, also stressing the nature of the relationships between monetary and fiscal policies, and between the Central Bank and the Treasury's Debt Management Office.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, Charles, 2017. "A Central Bank’s optimal balance sheet size?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84205, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:84205
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84205/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Reis, Ricardo, 2016. "Funding quantitative easing to target inflation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67883, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. William A. Allen, 2017. "Quantitative Easing and the Independence of the Bank of England," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 241(1), pages 65-69, August.
    3. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Egemen Eren & Timothy Jackson & Giovanni Lombardo, 2024. "The macroprudential role of central bank balance sheets," Working Papers 202408, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    2. Egemen Eren & Timothy Jackson & Giovanni Lombardo, 2024. "The macroprudential role of central bank balance sheets," BIS Working Papers 1173, Bank for International Settlements.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Goodhart, Charles, 2017. "A Central Bank’s Optimal Balance Sheet Size?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Michiel Bijlsma & Wouter Elsenburg & Michiel van Leuvensteijn, 2010. "Four Futures for Finance; A scenario study," CPB Document 211.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Bruche, Max & Segura, Anatoli, 2017. "Debt maturity and the liquidity of secondary debt markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 599-613.
    4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Michal Skorepa & Jakub Seidler, 2015. "Capital buffers based on banks’ domestic systemic importance: selected issues," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 7(3), pages 207-220, August.
    6. Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2024. "Bank Runs, Fragility, and Regulation," Working Papers 804, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    7. Ricardo Reis, 2016. "Can the Central Bank Alleviate Fiscal Burdens?," Discussion Papers 1701, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    8. Acharya, Viral V. & Skeie, David, 2011. "A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(5), pages 436-447.
    9. Kris James Mitchener & Matthew Jaremski, 2014. "The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 20603, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Suarez, Javier & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio, 2018. "Approaching non-performing loans from a macroprudential angle," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 7, European Systemic Risk Board.
    11. Massimiliano Affinito & Matteo Piazza, 2021. "Always Look on the Bright Side? Central Counterparties and Interbank Markets during the Financial Crisis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(1), pages 231-283, March.
    12. Ippolito, Filippo & Peydró, José-Luis & Polo, Andrea & Sette, Enrico, 2016. "Double bank runs and liquidity risk management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 135-154.
    13. Gorton, Gary & Huang, Lixin, 2006. "Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1613-1629, October.
    14. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Niepelt, Dirk, 2019. "On the equivalence of private and public money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 27-41.
    15. Carletti, Elena & De Marco, Filippo & Ioannidou, Vasso & Sette, Enrico, 2021. "Banks as patient lenders: Evidence from a tax reform," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 6-26.
    16. Chatterji, Shurojit & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2010. "Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 27, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    17. Joseph Mason, 2001. "Do Lender of Last Resort Policies Matter? The Effects of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Banks During the Great Depression," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(1), pages 77-95, September.
    18. Sandra Eickmeier & Norbert Metiu & Esteban Prieto, 2016. "Time-varying volatility, financial intermediation and monetary policy," CAMA Working Papers 2016-32, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    19. Shekhar Aiyar & Charles W. Calomiris & Tomasz Wieladek, 2015. "How to Strengthen the Regulation of Bank Capital: Theory, Evidence, and A Proposal," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 27(1), pages 27-36, March.
    20. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Bank balance sheet; monetary policy renormalisation; debt management; interest rate risk; auction risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:84205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.