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A banking union of ideas? The impact of ordoliberalism and the vicious circle on the EU banking union

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  • Schäfer, David

Abstract

The establishment of the EU banking union reveals two major shortcomings of liberal intergovernmentalism. First, it fails to explain the preference formation of the most important actor – the German government. The banking sector was divided between public and private banks, and there is no clear-cut pattern about whose interests the German government promoted. Second, material bargaining power cannot account for German concessions despite favourable power asymmetries. This article seeks to demonstrate how an ideational frame can convincingly fill these gaps. Ordoliberal ideas were constitutive for German preferences. The manipulative use of ideas as strategic resources by the German government’s opponents explains why it made significant concessions. Germany’s government publicly acknowledged that breaking the ‘vicious circle’ between banks and sovereigns was the main objective of the banking union. This became a rhetorical trap used by a coalition of Southern European member states to force the German government to make concessions.

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  • Schäfer, David, 2016. "A banking union of ideas? The impact of ordoliberalism and the vicious circle on the EU banking union," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65875, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:65875
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65875/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gerard Strange, 2018. "The euro crisis, euro reform, and the problem of hegemony," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 125-139, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking union; ordoliberalism; economic and monetary union; euro zone crisis; vicious circle between banks and sovereigns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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