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Parameterized games, minimal Nash correspondences, and connectedness

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  • Page, Frank

Abstract

Economics and game theory are replete with examples of parameterized games. We show that all minimal Nash payoff USCOs belonging to the Nash equilibrium correspondence of a parameterized game with payoff functions that are uniformly equicontinuous in players’ action choices with respect to parameters have minimal Nash USCOs that are essentially-valued as well as connected-valued. We also show that in general for any uniformly equicontinuous parameterized game, the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the composition of two correspondences: the graph correspondence of the collective security mapping and the Ky Fan Correspondence. The graph correspondence, a mapping from the parameter space into Ky Fan sets, encodes the specifics of the parameterized game being consider, while the Ky Fan Correspondence (i.e., the KFC), a mapping from Ky Fan sets into Nash equilibria, is universal and common to all parameterized games. We also show that the range of the graph correspondence, contained in the hyperspace of Ky Fan sets is a hyperspace Peano continuum - and is therefore locally connected. This means that for any two distinct Ky Fan sets contained in the range of graph correspondence there is a continuous segment in the range of the graph correspondence containing these two distinct Ky Fan sets as endpoints.

Suggested Citation

  • Page, Frank, 2015. "Parameterized games, minimal Nash correspondences, and connectedness," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65102, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:65102
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65102/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. A. S. Nowak & T. E. S. Raghavan, 1992. "Existence of Stationary Correlated Equilibria with Symmetric Information for Discounted Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 519-526, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Page, Frank, 2016. "Stationary Markov equilibria for approximable discounted stochastic games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67808, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Page, Frank, 2015. "A fixed point theorem for measurable-selection-valued correspondences arising in game theory," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65101, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Zachary Feinstein, 2022. "Continuity and sensitivity analysis of parameterized Nash games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 233-249, October.
    4. Sam Ganzfried, 2022. "Human Strategic Decision Making in Parametrized Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-23, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    minimal USCO; uniformly equicontinuous sets of payoff functions; essentialNash equilibria; connected sets of Nash equilibria; hyperspaces of Ky Fan sets; Nikaido and Isoda functions; quasi-minimal USCOs; 3M mappings; KFCcorrespondences; dense selections; Peano continua; locally connected continua.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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