IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/61879.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets

Author

Listed:
  • Nava, Francesco

Abstract

The paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades. A model is presented in which the identity of buyers, of sellers, and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade flows in the economy. The analysis first considers small economies, and provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence, a characterization of prices and flows, and some negative results relating welfare to network structure. The second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets, and presents necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be approximately efficient when the number of players is large.

Suggested Citation

  • Nava, Francesco, 2015. "Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61879, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:61879
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61879/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Desmond Cai & Subhonmesh Bose & Adam Wierman, 2019. "On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(3), pages 1122-1144, August.
    2. Ana Babus & Péter Kondor, 2018. "Trading and Information Diffusion in Over‐the‐Counter Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1727-1769, September.
    3. Yasuhiro Shirata, 2020. "Evolution of a Collusive Price in a Networked Market," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 528-554, June.
    4. Itkonen, Juha, 2017. "Efficiency and dependency in a network of linked permit markets," Research Discussion Papers 20/2017, Bank of Finland.
    5. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2017_020 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Goyal, S., 2016. "Networks and Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1652, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Daniele Condorelli & Andrea Galeotti & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Selling through referrals," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 669-685, October.
    8. Kostas Bimpikis & Shayan Ehsani & Rahmi İlkılıç, 2019. "Cournot Competition in Networked Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2467-2481, June.
    9. Hase, Ryo & Shinomiya, Norihiko, 2016. "A mathematical modeling technique with network flows for social welfare maximization in deregulated electricity markets," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 3(C), pages 59-66.
    10. Chen, Jun & Elliott, Matthew & Koh, Andrew, 2023. "Capability accumulation and conglomeratization in the information age," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    11. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018. "Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation," Working Paper Series rwp18-001, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    12. Chen, J. & Elliott, M. & Koh, A., 2020. "Capability Accumulation and Conglomeratization in the Information Age," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2069, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    13. Barauskaite, Kristina & Nguyen, Anh D.M., 2021. "Global intersectoral production network and aggregate fluctuations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    14. Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers & Yves Zenou, 2016. "Networks: An Economic Perspective," Papers 1608.07901, arXiv.org.
    15. Thành Nguyen & Karthik Kannan, 2021. "Welfare Implications in Intermediary Networks," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 378-393, June.
    16. Leduc, Mathieu V., 2024. "Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 27-53.
    17. Itkonen, Juha, 2017. "Efficiency and dependency in a network of linked permit markets," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 20/2017, Bank of Finland.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    decentralized markets; intermediation; oligopoly; efficiency; market power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:61879. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.