IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/36546.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Self-reporting untoward events to external controllers: accounting for reporting failure by a top tier chemical plant

Author

Listed:
  • Etienne, Julien

Abstract

This paper explores the reasons of hazardous organizations for responding to state rules requesting them to report untoward events to public regulators. The literature on external reporting of untoward events remains remarkably limited, and this paper contributes to it by providing a rare empirical account of the micro-level factors and processes behind reporting failures. It builds on empirical research on a case in the French chemical industry. The paper discusses a reporting failure by addressing principally managers' motivations and how they are shaped by the regulatory context, the regulator-regulatee relationship, and the organization's policies and rules. The paper provides also a vivid picture of patterns of over-compliance, compliance and non-compliance by the same regulated organization, and makes suggestions on the power and limits of self-regulation to help fulfil regulatory goals such as self-reporting of untoward events.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne, Julien, 2010. "Self-reporting untoward events to external controllers: accounting for reporting failure by a top tier chemical plant," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 36546, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:36546
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36546/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Big field, small potatoes: An empirical assessment of EPA's self-audit policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 415-432.
    2. Sarah L. Stafford, 2007. "Should you turn yourself in? The consequences of environmental self-policing," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 305-326.
    3. Prakash,Aseem, 2000. "Greening the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521662499, October.
    4. Siegwart Lindenberg, 2000. "It Takes Both Trust and Lack of Mistrust: The Workings of Cooperation and Relational Signaling in Contractual Relationships," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 4(1), pages 11-33, March.
    5. Katrin Millock & David Zilberman, 2006. "Collective penalties and inducement of self-reporting," Post-Print halshs-00118778, HAL.
    6. Robin L. Dillon & Catherine H. Tinsley, 2008. "How Near-Misses Influence Decision Making Under Risk: A Missed Opportunity for Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(8), pages 1425-1440, August.
    7. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
    8. Michael W. Toffel, 2008. "Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 45-71, May.
    9. Innes, Robert, 2001. "Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 239-256, April.
    10. Eric Helland, 1998. "The Enforcement Of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, And Self-Reporting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 141-153, February.
    11. Prakash,Aseem, 2000. "Greening the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521664875, October.
    12. Claus Rerup, 2009. "Attentional Triangulation: Learning from Unexpected Rare Crises," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(5), pages 876-893, October.
    13. Pfaff, Alexander S P & Sanchirico, Chris William, 2000. "Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 189-208, April.
    14. Parker,Christine, 2002. "The Open Corporation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818902, October.
    15. Katrin Millock & David Zilberman, 2006. "Collective penalties and inducement of self-reporting," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00118778, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert Innes, 2017. "Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 107-131, October.
    2. Guerrero, Santiago & Innes, Robert, 2008. "Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs? Evidence from a Cross-State Panel," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6204, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Earnhart, Dietrich & Harrington, Donna Ramirez, 2014. "Effect of audits on the extent of compliance with wastewater discharge limits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 243-261.
    4. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, 2011. "Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 609-649.
    5. Michael W. Toffel, 2008. "Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 45-71, May.
    6. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing," Working Papers 27, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, revised 08 Sep 2006.
    7. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
    8. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    9. Friesen, Lana & Gangadharan, Lata, 2013. "Designing self-reporting regimes to encourage truth telling: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 90-102.
    10. Sang-Hyun Kim, 2015. "Time to Come Clean? Disclosure and Inspection Policies for Green Production," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(1), pages 1-20, February.
    11. James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2005. "An Investigation of Voluntary Discovery and Disclosure of Environmental Violations Using Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 2005-7, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
    12. Lars Hansen & Frank Jensen & Linda Nøstbakken, 2014. "Quota Enforcement in Resource Industries: Self-Reporting and Differentiated Inspections," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 58(4), pages 539-562, August.
    13. Friesen, Lana, 2006. "The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 280-294, May.
    14. Evans, Mary F. & Liu, Lirong & Stafford, Sarah L., 2015. "Standardization and the impacts of voluntary program participation: Evidence from environmental auditing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 10-21.
    15. Häckner, Jonas & Herzing, Mathias, 2017. "The effectiveness of environmental inspections in oligopolistic markets," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 83-97.
    16. Carmen Arguedas, 2013. "Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 156-176, October.
    17. Lirong Liu & Mary F. Evans & Sarah Stafford, 2012. "Firm Decision-making Structure and Compliance with Environmental Regulations: Evidence from Environmental Auditing," Working Papers 1206, Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business.
    18. Mary Evans & Lirong Liu & Sarah Stafford, 2011. "Do environmental audits improve long-term compliance? Evidence from manufacturing facilities in Michigan," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 279-302, December.
    19. Calel, Raphael & Dechezlepretre, Antoine & Venmans, Frank, 2023. "Policing carbon markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120565, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl, 2005. "Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(3), pages 265-279, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:36546. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.