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Credibility and cheap talk of securities analysts: theory and evidence

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  • Blanes i Vidal, Jordi

Abstract

This paper studies how investors react to public messages that may be optimistically biased. We first construct a communication game between an investor and a (possibly) biased securities analyst. We find an equilibrium characterised by the following properties: first, the investor reacts more to bad news than to good news, and second, the difference in this reaction is higher when the investor has a greater prior suspicion that the analyst is a biased type. We then use nonparametric techniques and a large database of earnings forecasts to test these predictions, and find that the evidence supports them. Lastly, we use our empirical strategy to discriminate between the causes for analysts’ bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, 2003. "Credibility and cheap talk of securities analysts: theory and evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24897, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:24897
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24897/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2011. "Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games with Intervention," Working Papers 1106, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
    2. Sébastien GALANTI & Zahra BEN BRAHAM, 2013. "Recommendation Value on an Emerging Market: the Impact of Financial Analysts Recommendations on Stock Price and Trading Volume in Tunisia," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 1393, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    3. Tobias Gesche, 2016. "De-biasing strategic communication," ECON - Working Papers 216, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2021.
    4. Zahra Ben Braham & Sébastien Galanti, 2014. "Recommendation Value on an Emerging Market: the Impact of Analyst' Recommendations on Stock Prices and Trading Volumes in Tunisia," Working Papers halshs-01015380, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cheap Talk; credibility; securities analysts; stock market reaction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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