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Are U.S. sanctions off-target: evidence from the Magnitsky act

Author

Listed:
  • Djankov, Simeon
  • Su, Meng

Abstract

We compile data on US sanctions under the Magnitsky Act from 2017 to 2024 and find that such sanctions are weakly corelated with human rights abuses in the home countries of the sanctioned persons but are uncorrelated with perceptions of corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Djankov, Simeon & Su, Meng, 2024. "Are U.S. sanctions off-target: evidence from the Magnitsky act," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 124415, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:124415
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/124415/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erica Bosio & Simeon Djankov & Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2022. "Public Procurement in Law and Practice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(4), pages 1091-1117, April.
    2. Cristiane Lucena Carneiro & Laerte Apolinário, 2016. "Targeted Versus Conventional Economic Sanctions: What Is at Stake for Human Rights?," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(4), pages 565-589, August.
    3. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2019. "Do sanctions lead to a decline in civil liberties?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 191-215, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Magnitsky act; economic sanctions; human rights abuse; perceptions of corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism

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