Do tenure‐based voting rights help mitigate the family firm control‐growth dilemma?
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2008. "One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 51-91.
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More about this item
Keywords
control-enhancing mechanisms; disproportional ownership; family firms; tenure-voting rights; underinvestment;
All these keywords.JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2024-07-22 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2024-07-22 (Corporate Finance)
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