Kosher pork
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Other versions of this item:
- Drazen, Allan & Ilzetzki, Ethan, 2023. "Kosher Pork," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
- Ethan Ilzetzki & Allan Drazen, 2011. "Kosher Pork," 2011 Meeting Papers 692, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Allan Drazen & Ethan Ilzetzki, 2010. "Kosher Pork," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 172, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Allan Drazen & Ethan Ilzetzki, 2011. "Kosher Pork," NBER Working Papers 16667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Hans Gersbach & Fikri Pitsuwan & Giovanni Valvassori Bolgè, 2024. "Volatility and Resilience of Democratic Public-Good Provision," CESifo Working Paper Series 11004, CESifo.
- Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.
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More about this item
Keywords
pork barrel; earmarks; agenda setting; legislature; signaling; rent seeking;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
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