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Building an effective financial stability policy framework: lessons from the post-crisis decade

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  • Demekas, Dimitri G.

Abstract

A decade after the global financial crisis, the task of building a financial stability policy framework has unfinished business. Fundamental questions about the goal of financial stability and the policies to achieve it were sidelined by the excessive focus on the minutiae of macroprudential policy. Increased responsibilities were given to central banks without a proper discussion about the right degree of delegation and accountability. A comprehensive framework for financial stability should have three pillars: macroprudential policy, microprudential supervision, and financial safety nets. Sufficient operational independence should be given to the agency(ies) responsible for financial stability but determining the goal, institutional architecture, and agency assignments, resolving any policy tradeoffs, and ensuring accountability should be a political responsibility. Even with the best framework, however, given the variety of structural, behavioral, and political economy factors affecting financial stability and our limited understanding of the financial system, securing this goal will remain a challenge.

Suggested Citation

  • Demekas, Dimitri G., 2019. "Building an effective financial stability policy framework: lessons from the post-crisis decade," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100483, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:100483
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100483/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Boďa, Martin & Zimková, Emília, 2021. "Overcoming the loan-to-deposit ratio by a financial intermediation measure — A perspective instrument of financial stability policy," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 1051-1069.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial stability; macroprudential policy; banks; policy design; governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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