In imperfect democracies, does political competition always improve the provision of public goods?

Studying the provision of public goods in 74 Russian regions between 2004-2009 provides an opportunity to test this hypothesis. Results show that governors appointed by the federal government provide more public goods (in this case, education and health care) than governors drawn from local elites who were reappointed by the federal government when there is competition in the legislature. But in cases where the ruling party is strong (virtual monopoly) or when party share is low enough that governors can do little to raise party support, governors with local ties provide more public goods. These effects diverge from the predictions of the previous literature. This non-monotonic (inverted U-relationship) between public goods provision and initial party share suggests that formal mechanisms of accountability (administrative subordination to the central government) work worse under political monopoly, while informal mechanisms (such as local ties and strong networks) work worse under political competition to encourage public goods spending.