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Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System

Author

Listed:
  • Begenau, Juliane

    (Harvard University)

  • Landvoigt, Tim

    (University of TX)

Abstract

How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in the capital regulation of commercial banks? We propose a tractable, quantitative general equilibrium model with regulated and unregulated banks to study the unintended consequences of regulatory policy. Tightening the capital requirement from the status quo creates a safer banking system despite more shadow banking activity. A reduction in aggregate liquidity provision decreases the funding costs of all banks, raising profits and reducing risk-taking incentives. Calibrating the model to data on financial institutions in the U.S., we find the optimal capital requirement is around 15%.

Suggested Citation

  • Begenau, Juliane & Landvoigt, Tim, 2017. "Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System," Research Papers 3558, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:3558
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Greg Buchak & Gregor Matvos & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2024. "Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(2), pages 616-693.
    2. Mark Gertler & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Andrea Prestipino, 2020. "Credit Booms, Financial Crises, and Macroprudential Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 8-33, August.
    3. Segura, Anatoli & Villacorta, Alonso, 2020. "Firm-bank linkages and optimal policies in a lockdown," CEPR Discussion Papers 14838, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. James R. Barth & Stephen Matteo Miller, 2018. "On the Rising Complexity of Bank Regulatory Capital Requirements: From Global Guidelines to their United States (US) Implementation," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-33, November.
    5. Erica Jiang & Gregor Matvos & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2020. "Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage," NBER Working Papers 26903, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2022. "Macroprudential policy with leakages," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    7. Monacelli, Tommas & Jamilov, Rustam, 2020. "Bewley Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 15428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2021. "Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation [Securitization without Risk Transfer]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(6), pages 2622-2653.
    9. Poeschl, Johannes & Zhang, Xue, 2018. "Bank Capital Regulation and Endogenous Shadow Banking Crises," MPRA Paper 92529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Gomes, João F. & Grotteria, Marco & Wachter, Jessica A., 2023. "Foreseen risks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    11. Muñoz, Manuel A., 2020. "Macroprudential policy and the role of institutional investors in housing markets," Working Paper Series 2454, European Central Bank.
    12. Barth, James R. & Miller, Stephen Matteo, 2018. "Benefits and costs of a higher bank “leverage ratio”," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 37-52.
    13. Yasser Boualam & Clément Mazet-Sonilhac, 2021. "Aggregate Implications of Credit Relationship Flows: a Tale of Two Margin," Working papers 801, Banque de France.
    14. Mikkelsen, Jakob & Poeschl, Johannes, 2019. "Banking Panic Risk and Macroeconomic Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 94729, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Arseneau, David & Brang, Grace & Darst, Matt & Faber, Jacob & Rappoport, David & Vardoulakis, Alexandros, 2023. "A Macroprudential Perspective on the Regulatory Boundaries of US Financial Assets," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, July.
    16. d'Avernas, Adrien & Vandeweyer, Quentin & Darracq Pariès, Matthieu, 2020. "Unconventional monetary policy and funding liquidity risk," Working Paper Series 2350, European Central Bank.
    17. Dempsey, Kyle P., 2020. "Macroprudential capital requirements with non-bank finance," Working Paper Series 2415, European Central Bank.
    18. Begenau, Juliane, 2020. "Capital requirements, risk choice, and liquidity provision in a business-cycle model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 355-378.
    19. Simon, Luis, 2021. "Capital requirements in a model of bank runs: The 2008 run on repo," Latin American Journal of Central Banking (previously Monetaria), Elsevier, vol. 2(3).

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