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Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program

Author

Listed:
  • Nejat Anbarci
  • Ching-jen Sun

Abstract

This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash’s crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.

Suggested Citation

  • Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program," Working Papers 2012_9, Deakin University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2012_9
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    File URL: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/workingpapers/papers/2012_9.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions; Nash program; axiomatic characterization; noncooperative foundations; economics of search.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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