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Famille de fonds de pension, performance et persistance de la performance

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  • Fabrice Hervé

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

(VF)De plus en plus de fonds de retraite à cotisations définies appartiennent à des familles. Une famille de fonds comprend tous les fonds gérés par la même société. Le fait d’appartenir à une famille soulève des interrogations sur l’adéquation entre l’objectif d’un fonds (procurer à ses détenteurs la performance la plus élevée possible) et l’objectif de sa famille (rapporter à la société offrant une gamme de fonds le profit le plus élevé possible). Les grandes familles sont plus à même de manipuler les ressources dont elles disposent et, partant, d’influencer la performance et la persistance de la performance de leurs fonds. Nous montrons que les fonds appartenant aux plus grandes familles produisent des performances plus stables à moyen terme, mais réalisent des performances similaires à celles de leurs homologues de petites familles et enfin, que les fonds les meilleurs des grandes familles ne voient pas leurs performances persister. Les implications de ces résultats sont doubles : 1. si les grandes familles semblent posséder les moyens d’assurer une plus grande régularité dans les performances de leurs fonds, ceci ne se fait apparemment pas au détriment de certains de leurs fonds ; autrement dit, les familles de fonds de retraite ne constituent pas des entités coordonnées 2. les actuels cotisants ont intérêt à confier la gestion de leur épargne-retraite à des fonds de grandes familles afin de se voir confronté à un moindre risque de trajectoire. (VA) More and more defined contribution pension funds belong to families. A family of funds includes all the funds managed by the same company. Family affiliation raises interrogations on the adequacy between the objective of the fund (to produce the highest performance for its contributors) and the objective of its family (to maximize profit of the pension funds selling firm). Big families are more able to handle their resources and, therefore, to influence the performance and the performance persistence of their funds. We show that funds belonging to largest families produce more stable performance in the medium term, but carry out performance similar to those of their counterparts of small families. Moreover, the best performing funds within families do not exhibit performance persistence. The implications of these results are the following: 1. If big families can ensure a greater performance persistence of their funds, this is apparently not done to the detriment of some of their funds; in other words, the families of pension funds do not constitute coordinated entities 2. Actual contributors may find beneficial to invest their retirement savings in big families funds in order to support less path dependency in the evolution of their savings.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Hervé, 2006. "Famille de fonds de pension, performance et persistance de la performance," Working Papers CREGO 1060903, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1060903
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fonds de pension; famille de fonds; performance; persistance de la performance; cotisations définies; Royaume-Uni.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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