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Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition: Evidence from Colombia

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  • Vargas, Juan
  • Villaveces, Marta-Juanita

Abstract

We study the relationship between two sources of political power and property tax revenues in contemporary rural Colombia. First, de jure political power is the extent to which local political elites can capture the public administration for their own benefit. Second, de facto political power is the extent to which economically powerful landowners can influence policy. Using a panel of municipalities, we show that places with either high economic or high political concentration raise more taxes, but places with both high political and economic concentration perform worse.

Suggested Citation

  • Vargas, Juan & Villaveces, Marta-Juanita, 2016. "Rural Property Tax Revenue in the Face of Economic Concentration and Political Competition: Evidence from Colombia," Research Department working papers 945, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    • Handle: RePEc:dbl:dblwop:945
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin & Nelson A. Ruiz & Juan F. Vargas, 2021. "The Real Winner's Curse," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 52-68, January.
    2. Brayan Alexander BARON ORTEGON, 2018. "Distribución Del Ingreso Rural En Colombia Y Línea De Pobreza: 2004-2014," Revista Galega de Economía, University of Santiago de Compostela. Faculty of Economics and Business., vol. 27(2), pages 99-112.
    3. Juan David Torres, 2022. "Shaping inequality? Property rights, landed elites and public lands in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20514, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

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