IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/629.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information About Moves in Extensive Games: II

Author

Listed:
  • Pradeep Dubey
  • Mamoru Kaneko

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Pradeep Dubey & Mamoru Kaneko, 1982. "Information About Moves in Extensive Games: II," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:629
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d06/d0629.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
    2. Pradeep Dubey & Martin Shubik, 1981. "Information Conditions, Communication and General Equilibrium," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(2), pages 186-189, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jude Kline, J., 2002. "Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 278-305, February.
    2. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 1982. "Revelation of Information in Strategic Market Games: A Critique of Rational Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 634R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 1985.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anwesha Banerjee & Nicolas Gravel, 2020. "Contribution to a public good under subjective uncertainty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 473-500, June.
    2. Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1994. "Nonatomic Economies and the Boundaries of Perfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 593-633, May.
    3. Morten L. Bech & Rodney J. Garratt, 2012. "Illiquidity in the Interbank Payment System Following Wide‐Scale Disruptions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(5), pages 903-929, August.
    4. Martin Shubik & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Approximate Cores of a General Class of Economies: Part II. Set-Up Costs and Firm Formation in Coalition Production Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 619, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Martin Shubik, 1977. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 462, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Harris Dellas & Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Incentive-Compatible And Efficient Resource Allocation In Large Economies: An Exact And Local Approach," Working Papers 213, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    7. Gaêl Giraud, 2007. "Walrasian non-tatonnement with incomplete and imperfectly competitive markets," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b07021, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    8. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Sayantan Ghosal & Ludovic Julien & Simone Tonin, 2020. "Existence and optimality of Cournot–Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 933-951, December.
    9. Martin Shubik, 2001. "Money and the Monetization of Credit," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1343, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Dubey, Pradeep & Sondermann, Dieter, 2003. "Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 26/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    11. Martin Shubik & Eric Smith, 2007. "Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 587-597, March.
    12. Shubik, Martin, 1985. "A note on enough money in a strategic market game with complete or fewer markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 231-235.
    13. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2016. "Strict Nash equilibria in non-atomic games with strict single crossing in players (or types) and actions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 95-109, April.
    14. Carlos Alós Ferrer & Ana B. Ania, 2002. "The Evolutionary Logic of Feeling Small," Vienna Economics Papers 0216, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    15. Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018. "Money as minimal complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 432-451.
    16. Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi & Martin Shubik, 2014. "Minimally complex exchange mechanisms: Emergence of prices, markets, and money," Department of Economics Working Papers 14-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    17. Shubik, Martin, 1990. "A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institutions," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 171-219, Elsevier.
    18. Giraud, Gael, 2003. "Strategic market games: an introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 355-375, July.
    19. Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018. "Graphical exchange mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 452-465.
    20. A. Dickson & R. Hartley, 2005. "The strategic Marshallian cross and bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0523, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:629. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Brittany Ladd (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cowleus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.