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Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey

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  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Abstract

Auctions and bidding models are attracting an ever increasing amount of attention. The Stark and Rothkopf (1977) bibliography includes approximately 500 papers on the subject; additional work has been reported since the bibliography was compiled. This paper presents a general framework for classifying and describing various auctions and bidding models, and surveys the major results of the literature in terms of this framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1979. "Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 496R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:496r
    Note: CFP 514.
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d04/d0496-r.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jack Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, 1978. "Elements of the Theory of Auctions and Contests," UCLA Economics Working Papers 118, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Ramsey, James B., 1978. "Federal Off-Shore Lease Sales and a Theoretical Analysis of Alternative Bidding Procedures," Working Papers 78-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. Paul Milgrom, 1978. "A Bidding Model of Price Formation Under Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 364, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Emil Attanasi, 1974. "Some Interpretations of Sequential Bid Pricing Strategies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1424-1427, July.
    5. Baron, David P, 1974. "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 1072-1073, December.
    6. Michael H. Rothkopf, 1969. "A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(7), pages 362-373, March.
    7. Richard Engelbrecht, 1977. "Note--A Note on Multivariate Risk and Separable Utility Functions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(10), pages 1143-1144, June.
    8. Irving H. Lavalle, 1967. "A Bayesian Approach to an Individual Player's Choice of Bid in Competitive Sealed Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(7), pages 584-597, March.
    9. F. M. Scherer, 1964. "The Theory of Contractual Incentives for Cost Reduction," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 78(2), pages 257-280.
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