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Default, Efficiency and Uniqueness

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Abstract

An adequate description of economic dynamics requires the introduction of a monetary system including default penalties and expectations in a society whose economy utilizes money and credit. This essay notes and discusses several of the factors involved in the use of money and credit in a process oriented economy. It links these observations with the general equilibrium treatment of the same underlying economy and formulates a government guidance game where the government sets several key parameters in a monetary economy sufficient to select a unique equilibrium. Low information and error correction are noted. The links to the first and second welfare theorems of GE are also considered as is the setting of the price level.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheng-Zhong Qin & Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 2017. "Default, Efficiency and Uniqueness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2095, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2095
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2095.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Kumar, Alok & Shubik, Martin, 2003. "A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 253-266, February.
    3. Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2011. "Default Penalty as a Selection Mechanism Among Multiple," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000060, David K. Levine.
    4. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    5. Dubey, Pradeep & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1994. "Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-293, May.
    6. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    General equilibrium; Strategic market games; Uniqueness; Aggregation; Information; Disequilibrium; Minimal institutions; Playable games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates

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