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Site collectif polluant et monopole : localisation et tarification

Author

Listed:
  • Denis LESCOP

    (CRESE, Université de Besançon)

Abstract

Un groupe d'agents décide de mettre à sa disposition un site collectif polluant. Pour ce faire, ils font appel à une entreprise chargée de la localisation et de la construction de l'installation. Celle-ci leur propose une procédure de localisation/tarification soumise à l'approbation de tous les agents. Dans un tel contexte, l'entreprise est forcée à internaliser les dommages subis par les agents dans sa fonction de coût : ce phénomène rappelle l'achat de droit à polluer. En information incomplète, les mécanismes incitatifs optimaux indiquent l'existence d'inefficacités dues à l'attribution d'une rente informationnelle à chaque agent : la localisation échoue alors qu'elle aurait profité à tout le monde. Dans deux applications (externalités diffuses et externalités locales) du modèle général, l'enchère optimale est complètement caractérisée.

Suggested Citation

  • Denis LESCOP, 2004. "Site collectif polluant et monopole : localisation et tarification," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2004014
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2004014.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul & Knez, Peter J. & Yaksick, Rudy, 1987. "A compensation mechanism for siting noxious facilities: Theory and experimental design," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 371-383, December.
    4. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Enchères; Externalités négatives; Biens collectifs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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