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A comparative analysis of EU Antidumping rules and application

Author

Listed:
  • Laura ROVEGNO

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

  • Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) and Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), KULeuven-LICOS, & CEPR)

Abstract

Trade policy in the European Union is characterized by an intensive use of Antidumping measures. In this paper we compare existing practices in the EU to WTO rules and to other WTO Members. Our comparative analysis reveals that the EU's "lesser-duty rule", which limits the magnitude of the Antidumping duty to the level of domestic injury caused by dumped imports, results in a lower average duty level in EU cases, particularly when compared to the US. In terms of the "Sunset Clause", which limits the duration of protection to 5 years, the EU presents a lower share of measures lasting beyond this limit as compared to other users of Antidumping. In recent years, the number of case initiations by the EU has decreased. There has also been a shift towards the imposition of duties and away from the use of price undertakings as a protectionist measure. In line with other WTO members, an increasing share of cases are targeted against China, where it used to be predominantly Central-European countries and Japan, as well as other low or middle income countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura ROVEGNO & Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE, 2011. "A comparative analysis of EU Antidumping rules and application," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2011023, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2011023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Liza Jabbour & Enrico Vanino & Zhigang Tao & Yan Zhang, 2016. "The good, the bad and the ugly: Chinese imports, EU anti-dumping measures and firm performance," Discussion Papers 2016-16, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    2. Chang, Yang-Ming & Raza, Mian F., 2023. "Dumping, antidumping duties, and price undertakings," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 131-151.
    3. Tobias D. Ketterer, 2016. "EU Anti-dumping and Tariff Cuts: Trade Policy Substitution?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 576-596, May.
    4. repec:lic:licosd:28511 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Wu, Shih-Jye & Chang, Yang-Ming & Chen, Hung-Yi, 2014. "Antidumping duties and price undertakings: A welfare analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 97-107.
    6. Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE & Christian VIEGELAHN, 2011. "No Protectionist Surprises: EU Antidumping Policy Before and During the Great Recession," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2011021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antidumping; European Union; Contingent protection; Trade policy; lesser duty rule; price undertakings; WTO;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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