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Can competition ever be fair ? Challenging the standard prejudice

Author

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  • Christian ARNSPERGER

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), FNRS-Belgium,Charie Hoover-UCL-Belgium)

  • Philippe DE VILLE

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

Abstract

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insuficient as a justification of fairness in competiton, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness,where "U” stands for the "usual” fairness notion, and S-fairness, where "S” stands for the "sequential” aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom : first of all, there is an "eclipse” of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors’ choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfar even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect much deeper aspects of unfairness.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian ARNSPERGER & Philippe DE VILLE, 2002. "Can competition ever be fair ? Challenging the standard prejudice," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2002016, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Marc Fleurbaey, 2012. "Three Solutions for the Compensation Problem," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Equality of Opportunity The Economics of Responsibility, chapter 2, pages 33-51, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Fleurbaey, Marc, 1995. "Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 25-55, April.
    4. Marc FLEURBAEY, 1994. "L’absence d’envie dans une problématique “post-welfariste”," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1994011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    5. Lane,Robert E., 1991. "The Market Experience," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521407373, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tom Burns & Ewa Roszkowska, 2009. "A social procedurial approach to the Pareto optimization problematique," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(5), pages 781-803, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General

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