Does Propitious Selection Explain why Riskier People Buy less Insurance
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- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2006. "Does Propitious Selection Explain why Riskier People buy less Insurance?," IDEI Working Papers 399, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2006. "Does Propitious Selection Explain Why Riskier People Buy Less Insurance?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5640, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2006. "Does propitious selection explain why riskier people buy less insurance?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Lars Hultkrantz & Gunnar Lindberg, 2011.
"Pay-as-you-speed An Economic Field Experiment,"
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 45(3), pages 415-436, September.
- Hultkrantz, Lars & Lindberg, Gunnar, 2009. "Pay-as-you-speed:An economic field-experiment," Working Papers 2009:8, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
- Hultkrantz, Lars & Lindberg, Gunnar, 2009. "Pay-As-You-Speed: An Economic Field-Experiment," Working Papers 2009:12, Örebro University, School of Business.
- Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2006. "Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 614, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010.
"Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2009. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 15586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- STANCIOLE Anderson, 2007. "Health Insurance and Life Style Choices: Identifying the Ex Ante Moral Hazard," IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-10, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD.
- Florian Heiss & Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter, 2009. "Regulation of private health insurance markets: Lessons from enrollment, plan type choice, and adverse selection in Medicare Part D," NBER Working Papers 15392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
Keywords
preference-based adverse selection; cherry picking; precaution; social insurance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-FIN-2006-06-10 (Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2006-06-10 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-IAS-2006-06-10 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2006-06-10 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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