Rewarding cooperation in social dilemmas
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, April.
- Haydée Lugo & Raúl Jiménez, 2006.
"Incentives to Cooperate in Network Formation,"
Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 15-27, August.
- Haydée Lugo, 2005. "Incentives to Cooperate in Network Formation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 181, Society for Computational Economics.
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- Peña, Jorge & Lehmann, Laurent & Nöldeke, Georg, 2013. "Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games," Working papers 2013/13, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
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