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The linkages between business strategies and compensation policies using miles and snow's framework

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  • Saura, M. D.
  • Gómez-Mejía, Luis R.

Abstract

This study links a multidimensional measure of compensatíon strategy to Miles and Snow's (1978) business strategies, and examines their interactive impact on firm performance. The results reported here indicate that a more mechanistic compensation strategy makes a greater contribution to firm performance among defenders, while a more organic compensation strategy makes a greater contribution to firm performance among prospectors

Suggested Citation

  • Saura, M. D. & Gómez-Mejía, Luis R., 1996. "The linkages between business strategies and compensation policies using miles and snow's framework," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 7055, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:7055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:3:p:593-616 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    3. Vasudevan Ramanujam & P. Varadarajan, 1989. "Research on corporate diversification: A synthesis," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(6), pages 523-551, November.
    4. Donald C. Hambrick & Ian C. MacMillan & Ricardo R. Barbosa, 1983. "Business Unit Strategy and Changes in the Product R&D Budget," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(7), pages 757-769, July.
    5. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, 1989. "Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 121-134, March.
    6. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & George T. Milkovich, 1987. "Compensation and Firm Performance," NBER Working Papers 2145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cabrera, Elizabeth F., 1998. "A computer-based aid for the design of a strategic organizational culture," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 6541, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.

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    Keywords

    Compensation strategies;

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