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The Politics of Trade Protection: Evidence from an EU-mandated Tari Liberalization in Morocco

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Listed:
  • Christian Ruckteschler
  • Adeel Malik
  • Ferdinand Eib

Abstract

Although non-tari measures (NTMs) have surpassed tari s as the most preva- lent instrument of trade protection globally, our knowledge of what drives these NTMs is extremely limited. This paper sheds light on the political determinants of non-tari protection using a rich empirical setting in Morocco. Taking advantage of a bilateral EU-Morocco trade agreement that resulted in an across the board tari cut and a subsequent rise in NTMs, we use a di erence-in-di erences regres- sion framework to show that sectors with close prior political connections to the royal family received disproportionately higher levels of non-tari protection than unconnected sectors. We also demonstrate that, in the wake of the EU-induced tari cut, connected sectors were mainly compensated through technical barriers to trade that depend on administrative oversight and are vulnerable to political in uence

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Ruckteschler & Adeel Malik & Ferdinand Eib, 2019. "The Politics of Trade Protection: Evidence from an EU-mandated Tari Liberalization in Morocco," CSAE Working Paper Series 2019-12, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    • Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2019-12
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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