A Field Experiment on Moral Suasion and Tax Compliance Focusing on Under-Declaration and Over-Deduction
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Cited by:
- Hallsworth, Michael & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Vlaev, Ivo, 2017.
"The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 14-31.
- John List & Robert Metcalfe & Michael Taylor & Ivo Vlaev, 2014. "The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance," Natural Field Experiments 00391, The Field Experiments Website.
- Michael Hallsworth & John List & Robert Metcalfe & Ivo Vlaev, 2014. "The Behavioralist As Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance," NBER Working Papers 20007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anna P. Kireyenko, 2015. "Methods of investigating taxation in today’s foreign literature," Journal of Tax Reform, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 1(2-3), pages 209-228.
- James Alm & William D. Schulze & Carrie von Bose & Jubo Yan, 2019.
"Appeals to Social Norms and Taxpayer Compliance,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 638-666, October.
- James Alm & William D. Schulze & Carrie Von Bose & Jubo Yan, 2019. "Appeals to Social Norms and Taxpayer Compliance," Working Papers 1902, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Chirico & Robert P. Inman & Charles Loeffler & John MacDonald & Holger Sieg, 2014. "An Experimental Evaluation of Notification Strategies to Increase Property Tax Compliance: Free-Riding in the City of Brotherly Love," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 30, pages 129-161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2016. "Unpacking Negligence Liability: Experimentally Testing the Governance Effect," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 116-152, March.
More about this item
Keywords
tax compliance; moral suasion; field experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2012-06-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2012-06-13 (Informal and Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-06-13 (Public Economics)
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