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Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities

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  • Motta, Massimo
  • Hansen, Stephen

Abstract

In a vertical market in which downstream firms have private information about their productivity and compete for consumers, an upstream firm posts public bilateral contracts. When downstream firms are risk-neutral without wealth constraints, the upstream firm offers the input to all retailers. When they are sufficiently risk averse it sells to one, thereby eliminating externalities among downstream firms that necessitate the payment of risk premia. By similar reasoning exclusion is also optimal with downstream wealth constraints. Thus exclusion arises when contracts are fully observable and downstream firms are ex ante symmetric. The result is robust to a number of extensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Motta, Massimo & Hansen, Stephen, 2012. "Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 8982, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8982
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore & Reisinger, Markus, 2021. "Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
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    3. Markus Reisinger & Emanuele Tarantino, 2015. "Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 461-479, September.
    4. Yu Chen, 2017. "On the Equivalence of Bilateral and Collective Mechanism Design," Graz Economics Papers 2017-01, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    5. Lømo, Teis Lunde, 2015. "Risk sharing mitigates opportunism in vertical contracting," Working Papers in Economics 10/15, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; Exclusive contracts; Limited liability; Risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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