Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing
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- Edoardo Di Porto & Nicola Persico & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2013. "Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 35-62, February.
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- Montalvo, José G. & Piolatto, Amedeo & Raya, Josep, 2020.
"Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market,"
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- José Garcia Montalvo & Amedeo Piolatto & Josep M. Raya, 2019. "Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market," Economics Working Papers 1645, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- José G. Montalvo & Amedeo Piolatto & Josep Raya, 2019. "Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market," Working Papers 2019/03, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- José García-Montalvo & Amedeo Piolatto & Josep M. Raya, 2019. "Transaction-tax Evasion in the Housing Market," Working Papers 1080, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Appelgren, Leif, 2020. "A survey of models for determining optimal audit strategies," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
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- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2016. "Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001316, David K. Levine.
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- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2014. "Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000973, David K. Levine.
- Calel, Raphael & Dechezlepretre, Antoine & Venmans, Frank, 2023. "Policing carbon markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120565, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Edoardo Di Porto & Leandro Elia & Cristina Tealdi, 2013. "The "emersion" effect: an ex post and ex ante social program evaluation on labor tax evasion in Italy," Working Papers 2/2013, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, revised Jun 2013.
- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000000713, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Edoardo Di Porto & Leandro Elia & Cristina Tealdi, 2017. "Informal work in a flexible labour market," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 143-164.
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More about this item
Keywords
Audits; Deterrence; Tax evasion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2012-03-28 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-CMP-2012-03-28 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2012-03-28 (Informal and Underground Economics)
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