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The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget

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  • Widgren, Mika
  • Kauppi, Heikki

Abstract

It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.

Suggested Citation

  • Widgren, Mika & Kauppi, Heikki, 2009. "The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget," CEPR Discussion Papers 7220, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7220
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles B. Blankart & Christian Kirchner, 2003. "The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An Economic Analysis of Ways In and Ways Out," CESifo Working Paper Series 989, CESifo.
    2. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2004. "What determines EU decision making? Needs, power or both? [‘Implications of the EC expansion for European agricultural policies, trade and welfare’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 19(39), pages 222-266.
    3. Widgren, Mika & Kauppi, Heikki, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
    5. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
    6. Kandogan, Yener, 2000. "Political economy of eastern enlargement of the European Union: Budgetary costs and reforms in voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 685-705, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Massimo Bordignon & Simona Scabrosetti, 2016. "The Political Economy of Financing the EU budget," Working papers 42, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eu budget; Power indices;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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