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Legislative Process with Open Rules

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  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Fahrenberger, Theresa

Abstract

We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach, Hans & Fahrenberger, Theresa, 2007. "Legislative Process with Open Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 6240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6240
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Primo, 2007. "A comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The Open Rule Equilibrium and Coalition Formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 129-135, January.
    2. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1986. "A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 9-13.
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    Cited by:

    1. Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2011. "Structural estimation and solution of international trade models with heterogeneous firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 95-108, March.
    2. Gersbach, Hans & Britz, Volker, 2018. "Open Rule Legislative Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers 12966, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining in legislatures; Baron/ferejohn model; Open rules; Three-group and four-group equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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