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Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises: The New Old Framework

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  • Portes, Richard

Abstract

The Paper sets out the principles that should underlie sovereign debt restructuring. It argues for a rules-based approach to achieve private sector involvement in restructuring. The rules must operate, however, in the context of an appropriate institutional framework with appropriate incentives. The markets cannot and will not create these institutions without some official intervention. The Paper discusses why intervention in the form of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism has been shelved. It goes on to consider a new institutional framework, with a permanent bondholders? committee and collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts. It stresses the need for uniformity in CACs. After interpreting the views of market participants on CACs, the Paper concludes with an argument for official intervention to make CACs universal.

Suggested Citation

  • Portes, Richard, 2004. "Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises: The New Old Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 4717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4717
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Flandreau, 2013. "Sovereign states, bondholders committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the nineteenth century (1827–68): new facts and old fictions," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 668-696, WINTER.
    2. Häseler, Sönke, 2010. "Trustees versus fiscal agents and default risk in international sovereign bonds," MPRA Paper 35332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Rui Pedro Esteves, 2007. "Quis custodiet quem? Sovereign Debt and Bondholders` Protection Before 1914," Economics Series Working Papers 323, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Nicoletta Layher & Eyden Samunderu, 2020. "The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-32, December.
    5. Serbini, Bénédicte, 2012. "L’adoption des clauses d’actions collectives dans les obligations souveraines européennes," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 88(4), pages 479-497, Décembre.
    6. Marc Flandreau, 2013. "Collective Action Clauses before they had Airplanes: Bondholder Committees and the London Stock Exchange in the 19th Century (1827-1868)," IHEID Working Papers 01-2013, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective action clauses; Financial crises; Sovereign debt;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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