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Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition

Author

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  • Faulí-Oller, Ramon
  • Ok, Efe A
  • Ortuño-Ortin, Ignacio

Abstract

We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates are feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.

Suggested Citation

  • Faulí-Oller, Ramon & Ok, Efe A & Ortuño-Ortin, Ignacio, 2001. "Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2799
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    Cited by:

    1. Zakharov Alexei, 2005. "Candidate location and endogenous valence," EERC Working Paper Series 05-17e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    2. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 77-105, February.
    3. Amal Sanyal & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Reputation, Cheap Talk and Delegation," Game Theory and Information 0501001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2013. "Endogenous institutions and political extremism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 86-100.
    5. Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe, 2024. "Implementing direct democracy via representation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 85-92.
    6. Andrei M. Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2016. "Endogenous party platforms: ‘stochastic’ membership," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 839-866, October.
    7. Agustin Casas, 2020. "Ideological extremism and primaries," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 829-860, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political competition; Polarization;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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