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Contingent Contracts in Banking: Insurance or Risk Magnification?

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  • Gersbach, Hans

Abstract

What happens when banks compete with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks? We show that the private sector insures the banking system efficiently against banking crises through such contracts when banks focus on expected profit maximization and failing banks go bankrupt. When risks are large, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors who receive state-contingent contracts. Repackaging of the risk among depositors can improve welfare. In contrast, when failing banks are rescued, new phenomena such as risk creation or magnification emerge, which would not occur with non-contingent contracts. In particular, depositors receive non-contingent contracts with comparatively high interest rates, while entrepreneurs obtain loan contracts that demand high repayment in good times and low repayment in bad times. As a result, banks overinvest and generate large macroeconomic risks, even if the underlying productivity risk is small or zero.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach, Hans, 2021. "Contingent Contracts in Banking: Insurance or Risk Magnification?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15884
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial intermediation - macroeconomics risks - state-contingent contracts - banking regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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