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Gender Diversity Goals, Supply Constraints, and the Market for Seasoned Female Directors: The U.S. Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Dasgupta, Sudipto
  • Boyallian, Patricia
  • Homroy, Swarnodeep

Abstract

We show that over the last decade, growing public pressure for board gender diversity and awareness of gender equality issues in the U.S. has manifested in “seasoned†female board members accumulating multiple board appointments at a rate faster than seasoned male directors. The larger firms have been the most active in attracting seasoned female directors, at the expense of the smaller firms. This has likely contributed to the smaller firms lagging behind the larger firms in the pursuit of more gender balance. Our evidence is highly consistent with “supply constraints†, as reflected in high costs of recruiting first-time female directors, which the larger firms manage to avoid and the smaller firms find too costly to incur. Gender quota mandates are likely to expose the smaller firms even more to these costs; however, the absence of mandates may also not be optimal. Given growing public pressure, it may be necessary to mandate that larger firms maintain the ratio of first-time to seasoned female appointments above some level.

Suggested Citation

  • Dasgupta, Sudipto & Boyallian, Patricia & Homroy, Swarnodeep, 2020. "Gender Diversity Goals, Supply Constraints, and the Market for Seasoned Female Directors: The U.S. Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 15257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15257
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Liao, Rose C. & Loureiro, Gilberto & Taboada, Alvaro G., 2022. "Gender quotas and bank risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Board gender diversity; Gender quota; Supply constraints; Labor market for directors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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