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A Global Safe Asset for and from Emerging Market Economies

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  • Brunnermeier, Markus
  • Huang, Lunyang

Abstract

This paper examines international capital flows induced by flight-to-safety and proposes a new global safe asset. In the model domestic investors have to co-invest in a safe asset along with their physical capital. At times of crisis, investors replace the initially safe domestic government bonds with safe US Treasuries and fire-sell part of their capital. The reduction in physical capital lowers GDP and tax revenue, leading to increased default risk justifying the loss of the government bond's safe-asset status. We compare two ways to mitigate this self-fulfilling scenario. In the "buffer approach†international reserve holding reduces the severity of a crisis. In the "rechannelling approach'' flight-to-safety capital flows are rechannelled from international cross-border flows to flows across two EME asset classes. The two asset classes are the senior and junior bond of tranched portfolio of EME sovereign bonds.

Suggested Citation

  • Brunnermeier, Markus & Huang, Lunyang, 2018. "A Global Safe Asset for and from Emerging Market Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 13387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13387
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Luis Garicano & Philip R. Lane & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Tano Santos & David Thesmar & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2016. "The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 508-512, May.
    2. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    3. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    4. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    5. Ricardo J. Caballero & Emmanuel Farhi & Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, 2017. "The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 29-46, Summer.
    6. Gary Gorton & Stefan Lewellen & Andrew Metrick, 2012. "The Safe-Asset Share," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 101-106, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Janus, Jakub, 2022. "Cross-border flights to safe assets in bond markets: evidence from emerging market economies," MPRA Paper 113875, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Janus, Jakub, 2023. "Flights to safe assets in bond markets: Evidence from emerging market economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    3. Cronin, David & Dunne, Peter G., 2019. "How effective are sovereign bond-backed securities as a spillover prevention device?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 49-66.
    4. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Ricardo Reis, 2019. "Crash Course on the Euro Crisis," Working Papers 258, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    5. Janse Kalin Anev, 2023. "Developing European Safe Assets," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Sciendo, vol. 58(6), pages 315-319, December.
    6. Corsetti, G. & Maeng, S. H., 2023. "The Theory of Reserve Accumulation, Revisited," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2319, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Corsetti, G. & Maeng, S. H., 2023. "The Theory of Reserve Accumulation, Revisited," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2370, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Tilman Bletzinger & William Greif & Bernd Schwaab, 2022. "Can EU Bonds Serve as Euro-Denominated Safe Assets?," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-13, November.
    9. Michael David Bordo, 2021. "Monetary Policy Cooperation/Coordination and Global Financial Crises in Historical Perspective," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 587-611, July.
    10. Giancarlo Corsetti & Seung Hyun Maeng, 2023. "The Theory of Reserve Accumulation, Revisited," RSCAS Working Papers 2013_53, European University Institute.
    11. Janus, Jakub, 2021. "The COVID-19 shock and long-term interest rates in emerging market economies," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Flight to safety; Capital flows; Sudden stop; Sovereign bond backed securities; Sbbs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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