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Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?

Author

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  • Yafeh, Yishay
  • Yosha, Oved

Abstract

We investigate the nature of monitoring by stake holders using data on Japanese manufacturing firms. Shareholders and bank-centred corporate groups monitor firms by reducing activities with scope for managerial moral hazard such as advertising, R&D and entertainment expenses. Monitoring of this type takes place even when the monitored firm is not in financial distress. Although in Japan it is difficult to distinguish empirically between monitoring motivated by debt and monitoring motivated by equity stake, the data indicate that shareholders monitor firms continuously, while debt holders may intervene when firm performance is poor.

Suggested Citation

  • Yafeh, Yishay & Yosha, Oved, 1995. "Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1178
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daeheon Choi & Chune Young Chung & Young-Eun Kim & Ye Jun Kim & Paul Moon Sub Choi, 2020. "Sustainable Corporate Ownership Structures and Earnings Management in the Vietnamese Stock Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(15), pages 1-32, July.
    2. Gary Gorton & Matthias Kahl, 2002. "The Scarcity of Effective Monitors and Its Implications For Corporate Takeovers and Ownership Structures," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-30, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2000. "The optimal size of a bank: Costs and benefits of diversification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1701-1726, October.
    4. Wim Suyker & Henri de Groot, 2006. "China and the Dutch economy," CPB Document 127.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    5. Akihiko Kawaura, 2004. "Deregulation and governance: plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(5), pages 479-484.
    6. Eleftherios Thalassinos & Theodoros Kyriazidis & John Thalassinos, 2006. "The Greek Capital Market: Caught in Between Poor Corporate Governance and Market Inefficiency," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1-2), pages 3-24.
    7. Free Huizinga & S. Smulders, 2009. "Varieties and the terms of trade," CPB Discussion Paper 127.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    8. Gorton, Gary & Kahl, Matthias, 2001. "The Scarcity of Effective Monitors and Its Implications For Corporate Takeovers and Ownership Structures," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt2tj5w4mt, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    9. Jan Bonenkamp, 2005. "A comparison of catching-up premium rate models," CPB Memorandum 127.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks; Japanese Corporate Groups; Large Shareholders; Managerial Moral Hazard; Monitoring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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