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Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation

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  • Ellul, Andrew
  • WANG, Cong
  • Zhang, Kuo

Abstract

We investigate the impact of workers’ exposure to unemployment risk on the design of CEO incentive compensation. Through its impact on risk-taking activities, option-based compensation is likely to also influence unemployment risk which is internalized by the firm. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits as a source of variation in workers’ unemployment costs, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous boards increase the CEOs’ convex payoff structure. This behavior is consistent with the view that CEO’s risk-taking incentives are amplified by the board to take advantage of lower costs associated with unemployment risk. The increase in convexity payoff structures is stronger when CEO wealth is tied closely to firm performance, more pronounced in labor-intensive industries, and attenuated by the strength of unionization. Changes in the incentive structures are associated with riskier investment and financing strategies and better performance. Results suggest that executive compensation is one mechanism used by boards to internalize labor market frictions in firms’ decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ellul, Andrew & WANG, Cong & Zhang, Kuo, 2016. "Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11634
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    Cited by:

    1. Pagano, Marco & Picariello, Luca, 2023. "Talent discovery, layoff risk and unemployment insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
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    3. Ben-Nasr, Hamdi, 2019. "Do unemployment benefits affect the choice of debt source?11I would like to acknowledge the financial support from Qatar University, QUUG-CBE-DFE-17/18-6," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 88-107.
    4. Jie (Jack) He & Tao Shu & Huan Yang, 2018. "The Employee Clientele of Corporate Leverage: Evidence from Personal Labor Income Diversification," Working Papers 18-01, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unemployment risk; Human capital; Executive compensation; Risk taking; Leverage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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