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The Relation Between Voting Power and Policy Impact in the European Union

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  • Widgrén, Mika

Abstract

We examine national effects on the common policies of the European Union (EU). The paper establishes a difference between national influence on voting outcomes and policies. It is assumed that policies of the EU are public goods and Holler's public good power index is applied. The method is extended to cover voting games with coalitions to reveal also the effects of cooperation on policies. We show that small countries have more influence on common policies of the EU than on voting outcomes. Coalition formation can, however, ruin this since even coalitions smaller than the blocking minority can control policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Widgrén, Mika, 1994. "The Relation Between Voting Power and Policy Impact in the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1033, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1033
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Casella, Alessandra, 1996. "Large countries, small countries and the enlargement of trade blocs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 389-415, February.
    2. Krumm, Raimund & Herz, Bernhard, 1996. "The economic implications of voting requirements for the establishment of the European Monetary Union," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 82, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    3. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
    4. Krumm, Raimund & Herz, Bernhard, 1997. "Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 691-703, December.
    5. Johannes Pollak, 2004. "Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0019, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Game Theory; European Union; Voting Power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration

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