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Government involvement in liberalised gas markets; a welfare-economic analysis of Dutch gas-depletion policy

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Listed:
  • Machiel Mulder
  • Gijsbert Zwart

Abstract

This report analyses the welfare effects of two major components of the Dutch gas-depletion policy: the offtake guarantee for small-fields gas and the cap on production from the Groningen field. We conclude that the benefits of offtake guarantee currently may outweigh the costs, but a further development of the gas market would reverse this picture. The cost of the offtake guarantee is that it gives operators reduced incentives to respond optimally to short-term changes in market conditions compared to a competitive market. Regarding the cap on Groningen (42.5 bcm per year), we find that this measure is inefficient when the cap is binding, i.e. restricting the production from the Groningen field. The costs of capping Groningen production follow from shifting returns to the future. The benefits of this measures consist of slightly positive effects on small-fields production and positive benefits for security of supply.Read the background documents:CPB Memorandum 143: "Market failures and government policies in gas markets"CPB Memorandum 144: "NATGAS: a model of the European natural gas market"

Suggested Citation

  • Machiel Mulder & Gijsbert Zwart, 2006. "Government involvement in liberalised gas markets; a welfare-economic analysis of Dutch gas-depletion policy," CPB Document 110, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpb:docmnt:110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tóth, Borbála Takácsné & Kotek, Péter & Selei, Adrienn, 2020. "Rerouting Europe's gas transit landscape - Effects of Russian natural gas infrastructure strategy on the V4," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    2. András Kiss, Adrienn Selei, and Borbála Takácsné Tóth, 2016. "A Top-Down Approach to Evaluating Cross-Border Natural Gas Infrastructure Projects in Europe," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Sustainab).
    3. Machiel Mulder & Gijsbert Zwart, 2006. "Market failures and government policies in gas markets," CPB Memorandum 143, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    4. Schipperus, Ouren T. & Mulder, Machiel, 2015. "The effectiveness of policies to transform a gas-exporting country into a gas-transit country: The case of The Netherlands," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 117-127.
    5. van Witteloostuijn, Arjen & Brakman, Steven & van Marrewijk, Charles, 2007. "Welfare distribution effect of a price reduction in the Dutch gas transport market: A scenario analysis of regulatory policy, market form and rent allocation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6299-6308, December.
    6. Gijsbert Zwart & Machiel Mulder, 2006. "NATGAS: a model of the European natural gas market," CPB Memorandum 144, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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